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Abstract. We give a formal verification procedure that decides whether
a classifier ensemble is robust against arbitrary randomized attacks. Such
attacks consist of a set of deterministic attacks and a distribution over
this set. The robustness-checking problem consists of assessing, given a
set of classifiers and a labelled data set, whether there exists a random-
ized attack that induces a certain expected loss against all classifiers. We
show the NP-hardness of the problem and provide an upper bound on
the number of attacks that is sufficient to form an optimal randomized
attack. These results provide an effective way to reason about the ro-
bustness of a classifier ensemble. We provide SMT and MILP encodings
to compute optimal randomized attacks or prove that there is no attack
inducing a certain expected loss. In the latter case, the classifier ensem-
ble is provably robust. Our prototype implementation verifies multiple
neural-network ensembles trained for image-classification tasks. The ex-
perimental results using the MILP encoding are promising both in terms
of scalability and the general applicability of our verification procedure.
Keywords: Adversarial attacks · Ensemble classifiers · Robustness
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a rapid progress in machine learning (ML) with a strong
impact to fields like autonomous systems, computer vision, or robotics. As a
consequence, many systems employing ML show an increasing interaction with
aspects of our everyday life, consider autonomous cars operating amongst pedes-
trians and bicycles. While studies indicate that self-driving cars, inherently re-
lying on ML techniques, make around 80% fewer traffic mistakes than human
drivers [19], verifiable safety remains a major open challenge [25,13,23,5].
In the context of self-driving cars, for instance, certain camera data may con-
tain noise that can be introduced randomly or actively via so-called adversarial
attacks. We focus on the particular problem of such attacks in image classifica-
tion. A successful attack perturbs the original image in a way such that a human
does not recognize any difference while ML misclassifies the image. A measure
of difference between the ground truth classification, for instance by a human,
and a potentially perturbed ML classifier is referred as the loss.
⋆ Research funded by the project NWA.BIGDATA.2019.002: “EXoDuS - EXplainable
Data Science” and the FWO G030020N project “SAILor”
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A standard way to render image classification more robust against adver-
sarial attacks is to employ a set of classifiers, also referred to as classifier en-
sembles [2,20,21,3]. The underlying idea is to obscure the actual classifier from
the attacker. One possible formalization of the competition between an adver-
sarial attacker and the ensemble is that of a zero-sum game [20]: The attacker
chooses first, the ensemble tries to react to the attack with minimal loss — that
is, choosing a classifier that induces maximal classification accuracy.
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Fig. 1. We depict a single data point in R2 with label 1. The region to the left of the
solid vertical line corresponds to points labelled with 2 by one classifier; the region to
the right of the dashed line, those labelled with 2 by another classifier. Both (linear)
classifiers label all other points in R2 with 1. (Hence, they correctly label the data
point with 1.) The dotted attack, moving the data point left, induces a misclassifi-
cation of the point by one of the classifiers. The solid attack, moving the data point
right, induces a misclassification of the point by one of the classifiers. Note that every
attack has a classifier which is “robust” to it, i.e. it does not misclassify the perturbed
point. However, if the attacker chooses an attack uniformly at random, both of them
misclassify the point with probability 1/2.
In this setting, the attacker may need to use randomization to behave opti-
mally (see Fig. 1, cf. [6]). Such an attack is called optimal if the expected loss is
maximized regardless of the choice of classifier.
Inspired by previous approaches for single classifiers [15,12], we develop a for-
mal verification procedure that decides if a classifier ensemble is robust against
any randomized attack. In particular, the formal problem is the following. Given
a set of classifiers and a labelled data set, we want to find a probability distri-
bution and a set of attacks that induce an optimal randomized attack. Akin to
the setting in [20], one can provide thresholds on potential perturbations of data
points and the minimum shift in classification values. Thereby, it may happen
that no optimal attack exists, in which case we call the classifier ensemble robust.
Our aim is the development of a principled and effective method that is able to
either find the optimal attack or prove that the ensemble is robust with respect
to the predefined thresholds.
To that end, we first establish a number of theoretical results. First, we
show that the underlying formal problem is NP-hard. Towards computational
tractability, we also show that for an optimal attack there exists an upper bound
on the number of attacks that are needed. Using these results, we provide an SMT
encoding that computes suitable randomized attacks for a set of convolutional
neural networks with ReLU activation functions and a labelled data set. In case
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there is no solution to that problem, the set of neural networks forms a robust
classifier ensemble, see Fig. 2. Together with the state-of-the-art SMT solver
Z3 [9], this encoding provides a complete method to solve the problem at hand.
Yet, our experiments reveal that it scales only for small examples. We outline the
necessary steps to formulate the problem as a mixed-integer linear programming
(MILP), enabling the use of efficient optimization solvers like Gurobi [14].
Verifier
ROBUST/NOT ROBUST
Probabilities & attacks
Set of classifiers
Set of data points
Number of attacks
Max attack strength
Min prediction
perturbation
Fig. 2. The verifier takes as input a set of classifiers, a set of labelled data points, the
number of attacks, and the attack properties. If the verifier does not find a solution,
we can be sure is robust against any attack with the specific properties. Otherwise, it
returns the optimal attack.
In our experiments, we show the applicability of our approach by means of
a benchmark set of binary classifiers, which were trained on the MNIST and
German traffic sign datasets [10,24].
Related work
It is noteworthy that there is some recent work on robustness checking of decision-
tree ensembles [22]. However, their approach is based on abstract interpretation
and is thus not complete. Other approaches for robustness checking of machine
learning classifiers focus on single classifiers (see, e.g., [15,12,7,18]). Akin to our
approach, these works employ SMT solving. In [4], MILP-solving is used for ver-
ification tasks on (single) recurrent neural networks. In contrast, our framework
allows to compute attacks for classifier ensembles.
In [11], Dreossi et al. propose a robustness framework which unifies the opti-
mization and verification views on the robustness-checking problem and encom-
passes several existing approaches. They explicitly mention that their frame-
work applies to local robustness and argue most of the existing work on finding
adversarial examples and verifying robustness fits their framework. Our work,
when we have a single classifier and a singleton data set, fits precisely into their
framework. However, we generalize in those two dimensions by averaging over
the robustness target value (in their jargon) for all points in a data set, and by
considering ensemble classifiers. This means that our point of view of the adver-
sarial environment is neither that of a white-box attacker nor is it a black-box
attacker. Indeed, we know the set of classifiers but we do not know what strat-
egy is used to choose which (convex combination of) classifiers to apply. Our
environment is thus a gray-box attacker.
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2 Preliminaries
Let x be a vector (x1, . . . , xd) ∈ R
d. We write ‖x‖1 for the “Manhattan norm”
of x, that is
∑d
i=1 |xi|.
We will make use of a partial inverse of the max function. Consider a totally
ordered set Y and a function f : X → Y . Throughout this work we define the
argmax (arguments of the maxima) partial function as follows. For all S ⊆
X we set argmaxs∈S f(s) := m if m is the unique element of S such that
f(m) = maxs∈S f(s). If more than one element of S witnesses the maximum
then argmaxs∈S f(s) is undefined.
A probability distribution over a finite set D is a function µ : D → [0, 1] ⊆ R
with
∑
x∈D µ(x) = 1. The set of all distributions on D is Distr(D).
2.1 Neural networks
We loosely follow the neural-network notation from [15,12]. A feed-forward neural
network (NN for short) with d inputs and ℓ outputs encodes a function f : Rd →
Rℓ. We focus on NNs with ReLU activation functions. Formally, the function f
is given in the form of
– a sequence W(1), . . . ,W(k) of weight matrices with W(i) ∈ Rdi×di−1 , for all
i = 1, . . . , k, and
– a sequence B(1), . . . ,B(k) of bias vectors with B(i) ∈ Rdi , for all i = 1, . . . , k.
Additionally, we have that d0, . . . , dk ∈ N with d0 = d and dk = ℓ. We then set
f = g(k)(x) for all x ∈ Rd where for all i = 1, . . . , k we define
g(i)(x) := ReLU(W(i)g(i−1)(x) +B(i)),
and g(0)(x) := x. The ReLU function on vectors u is the element-wise maximum
between 0 and the vector entries, that is, if v = ReLU(u) then vi = max(0,ui).
We sometimes refer to each g(i) as a layer. Note that each layer is fully
determined by its corresponding weight and bias matrices.
2.2 Neural-network classifiers
A data set X ⊆ Rd is a finite set of (real-valued) data points x ∈ Rd of dimension
d ∈ N>0. A classifier c : X → [ℓ] is a partial function that attaches to each data
point a label from [ℓ] = {1, . . . , ℓ}, the set of labels. We denote the set of all
classifiers over X by C. An NN-encoded classifier is simply a partial function
f : Rd → Rk given as an NN that assigns to each data point x ∈ Rd the label
argmaxi∈[ℓ] h(i) where h(i) = f(x)i. Intuitively, the label is the index of the
largest entry in the vector resulting from applying f to x. Note that if the image
of x according to f has several maximal entries then the argmax and the output
label are undefined.
Definition 1 (Labelled data set). A labelled data set X = (X, ct) consists
of a data set X and a total classifier ct for X, i.e. ct is a total function.
In particular, ct(x) is defined for all x ∈ X and considered to be the “ground
truth” classification for the whole data set X .
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3 Problem Statement
We state the formal problem and provide the required notation. Recall that in
our setting we assume to have an ensemble of classifiers C ⊆ C. Such an ensemble
is attacked by a set of attacks that are selected randomly.
Definition 2 (Deterministic attack). A deterministic attack for a labelled
data set (X, ct) and a classifier c : X → [ℓ] is a function δ : X → R
d. An attack
δ induces a misclassification for x ∈ X and c if c(x + δ(x)) 6= ct(x) or if
c(x+ δ(x)) is undefined. The set of all deterministic attacks is ∆. An attack is
ε-bounded if ‖δ(x)‖1 ≤ ε holds for all x ∈ X.
We sometimes call the value x+ δ(x) the attack point. Note that it the classifier
c is not perfect, that is, c(x) 6= ct(x) for some x ∈ X , already a zero-attack
δ(x) = 0 leads to a misclassification.
We extend deterministic attacks by means of probabilities.
Definition 3 (Randomized attack). A finite set A ⊆ ∆ of deterministic
attacks together with a probability distribution P ∈ Distr(A) is a randomized
attack (A,P). A randomized attack is ε-bounded if for all attacks δ ∈ A with
P(δ) > 0 it holds that ‖δ(x)‖1 ≤ ε for all x ∈ X.
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Fig. 3. The dotted diamond contains the set of all 2-bounded attacks in the setting
described in Fig. 1. Both δ1 and δ2 are therefore 2-bounded (deterministic) attacks.
Hence, any randomized attack with A = {δ1, δ2} is also 2-bounded.
In general, a loss function ℓ : C×Rd×Rd → R describes the penalty incurred
by a classifier with respect to a labelled data point and an attack. In this work,
we will focus on the widely used zero-one loss.
Definition 4 (Zero-one loss function). The (0− 1)-loss function ℓ0−1 : C×
Rd × Rd → {0, 1} for a labelled data set (X, ct), a classifier c : X → [ℓ], and a
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deterministic attack δ ∈ A is given by the following for all x ∈ X
ℓ0−1(c,x, δ(x)) =
{
0 if c(x + δ(x)) = ct(x)
1 otherwise.
In particular, the loss function yields one if the image of the classifier c is unde-
fined for the attack point x+ δ(x). Note furthermore that the loss is measured
with respect to the ground truth classifier ct. Thereby, the classifier c and the
zero function as deterministic attack do not necessarily induce a loss of zero
with respect to ct. This assumption is realistic as, while we expect classifiers to
perform well with regard to the ground truth, we cannot assume perfect classi-
fication in realistic settings.
We now connect a randomized attack to an ensemble, that is, a finite set
C ⊆ C of classifiers. In particular, we quantify the overall value a randomized
attack induces with respect to the loss function and the ensemble.
Definition 5 (Misclassification value). The misclassification value of a ran-
domized attack (A,P) with respect to a labelled data set X = (X, ct) and a finite
set of classifiers C ⊆ C is given by
Val(A,P) := min
c∈C
1
|X |
∑
x∈X
E
δ∼P
[ℓ0−1(c,x, δ(x))]. (1)
This value is the minimum (over all classifiers) mean expected loss with respect
to the randomized attack and the classifiers from C. An optimal adversarial
attack against C ⊆ C with respect to a labelled data set (X, ct) is a randomized
attack which maximizes the value Val(A,P) in Equation (1).
We are now ready to formalize a notion of robustness in terms of ε-bounded
attacks and a robustness bound α ∈ R, as proposed in [20] for a set of classifiers.
Definition 6 (Bounded robustness). A set of classifiers C ∈ C for a labelled
data set (X, ct) is called robust bounded by ε and α (ε, α-robust) if it holds that
∀(A,P) ∈ 2∆ ×Distr(A).Val(A,P) < α, (2)
where the (A,P) range over all ε-bounded randomized attacks.
In other words, an (ε, α)-robust ensemble is such that for all possible ε-
bounded random attacks (A,P), there is at least one classifier c ∈ C from the
ensemble such that
∑
x∈X Eδ∼P[ℓ0−1(c,x, δ(x))] < α|X |. Conversely, an ensem-
ble is not (ε, α)-robust if there is an ε-bounded randomized attack with a mis-
classification value of at least α.
4 Theoretical Results
In this section we establish two key results that carry essential practical implica-
tion for our setting. First, we show that in order to obtain an optimal randomized
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Fig. 4. Continuing with the example from Figs 1 and 3, we now plot the expected loss
per attack and the corresponding classifier. (That is, the classifier which misclassifies
the perturbed point.) On the horizontal axis we have the probability x assigned to δ1
and we assume P(δ2) = 1−x. Note that x = 0.2 is such that the minimal expected loss,
i.e. the misclassification value, is strictly less than 0.3. Indeed, one classifier manages to
correctly classifier the perturbed point with probability 0.8 in this case. With x = 0.5
we see that the misclassification value is 0.5. Hence, the ensemble is not (2, 0.5)-robust.
attack, only a bounded number of deterministic attacks is needed.4 Thereby, we
only need to take a bounded number of potential attacks into account in order
to prove the α-robustness of a set of classifiers and a given labelled data set.
Second, we establish that our problem is in fact NP-hard, justifying the use
of SMT and MILP solvers to (1) compute any optimal randomized attack and,
more importantly, to (2) prove robustness against any such attack.
4.1 Bounding the number of attacks
In the following, we assume a fixed labelled data set (X, ct). For every classifier
c ∈ C and every deterministic attack δ ∈ ∆, let us write Mc(δ) to denote the
value
∑
x∈X ℓ0−1(c,x, δ(x)). Observe that 0 ≤ Mc(δ) ≤ |X | for all c ∈ C and
δ ∈ ∆. Furthermore, for all c ∈ C and randomized attacks (A,P) it holds that:∑
x∈X
E
δ∼P
[ℓ0−1(c,x, δ(x))] =
∑
x∈X
∑
δ∈A
P(δ) · ℓ0−1(c,x, δ(x))
=
∑
δ∈A
P(δ)
(∑
x∈X
ℓ0−1(c,x, δ(x))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Mc(δ)
=
∑
δ∈A
P(δ) ·Mc(δ)
We get that Equation (2) from Def. 5 is false if and only if the following holds.
∃(A,P) ∈ 2∆ ×Distr(A). ∀c ∈ C.
∑
δ∈A
P(δ) ·Mc(δ) ≥ α|X | (3)
4 An analogue of this property had already been observed by Perdomo and Singer
in [20, Section 3] in the case when classifiers are chosen randomly.
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Proposition 1 (Bounded number of attacks). Let α ∈ R and consider the
labelled data set (X, ct) together with a finite set of classifiers C ⊆ C. For all
randomized attacks (A,P), there exists a randomized attack (A′,P′) such that
– |A′| ≤ (|X |+ 1)|C|,
– Val(A′,P′) = Val(A,P), and
– (A′,P′) is ε-bounded if (A,P) is ε-bounded.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Let (A,P) be an ε-bounded randomized
attack with a misclassification value of α such that |A| > (|X |+ 1)|C|. Further
suppose that (A,P) is minimal (with respect to the size of A) amongst all such
randomized attacks. It follows that there are attacks δ, δ′ ∈ A such thatMc(δ) =
Mc(δ
′) for all c ∈ C. We thus have that
P(δ) ·Mc(δ) + P(δ
′) ·Mc(δ
′) = (P(δ) + P(δ′)) ·Mc(δ).
Consider now the randomized attack (A′,P′) obtained by modifying (A,P) so
that P(δ) = P(δ) + P(δ′) and δ′ is removed from A. From the above discussion
and Equation (3) it follows that (A′,P′), just like (A,P), has a misclassification
value of α. Furthermore, since A′ ⊆ A, we have that (A′,P′) is ε-bounded and
that |A′| < |A|. This contradicts our assumption regarding the minimality of
(A,P) amongst ε-bounded randomized attacks with the same value α. ⊓⊔
4.2 NP hardness of non-robustness checking
It is known that checking whether linear properties hold for a given NN with
ReLU activation functions is NP-hard [15]. We restate this using our notation.
Proposition 2 (From [15, Appendix I]). The following problem is NP-hard:
Given an NN-encoded function f : Rn → Rm and closed nonnegative intervals
(Ik)
n
1 , (Oℓ)
m
1 , decide whether there exists x ∈
∏n
k=1 Ik such that f(x) ∈
∏m
ℓ=1Oℓ.
Intuitively, determining whether there exist a point in a given box — that is, a
hypercube defined by a Cartesian product of intervals — from Rn whose image
according to f is in a given box from Rm is NP-hard. We will now reduce
this to the problem of determining if there is a randomized attack such that its
misclassification value takes at least a given threshold.
Theorem 1. The following problem is NP-hard: For a labelled data set X =
(X, ct), a set C of classifiers, and a value α ∈ Q, decide if there exists an ε-
bounded randomized attack (A,P) w.r.t. X and C such that Val(A,P) ≥ α.
Proof. We use Proposition 2 and show how to construct, for any NN-encoded
function g : Rn → R and any constraint ℓ ≤ g(x) ≤ u, two classifiers cℓ, cu
such that a single deterministic attack δ causes 0, the single data point, to be
misclassified by both cℓ and cu if and only if the constraint holds. Note that the
ε bound can be chosen to be large enough so that it contains the box
∏n
k=1 Ik
and that the identity function over nonnegative numbers is NN-encodable, that
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is, using the identity matrix as weight matrix W and a zero bias vector B. For
every instance of the problem from Proposition 2 we can therefore construct
2(n+m) NNs that encodes all input and output constraints: 2n of them based
on the identity function to encode input constraints and 2m based on the input
NN from the given instance. It follows that determining if there exists an ε-
bounded deterministic attack δ that causes 0 to be simultaneously misclassified
by a given classifier ensemble isNP-hard. Hence, to conclude, it suffices to argue
that the latter problem reduces to our robustness-value threshold problem. The
result follows from Lemmas 1 and 2. ⊓⊔
Enforcing interval constraints. Let g : Rn → R be an NN-encoded function
and ℓ, u ∈ R with ℓ ≤ u. Consider now the constraint ℓ ≤ g(x) ≤ u. Henceforth
we will focus on the labelled data set (X, ct) with X = {0} and ct(x) = 1.
Lower-bound constraint. We obtain cℓ by adding to the NN encoding of g a new
final layer with weight and bias vectors
W =
(
0
1
)
,B =
(
ℓ
0
)
to obtain the NN-encoded function g : Rn → R2. Note that g(v) = (ℓ, g(v))⊺
for all v ∈ Rn. It follows that cℓ(v) = 2 if g(v) > ℓ and cℓ(v) is undefined if
g(v) = ℓ. In all other cases the classifier yields 1.
Upper-bound constraint. To obtain cu we add to the NN encoding of g two new
layers. The corresponding weight matrices and bias vectors are as follows.
W(1) = (1), B(1) = (−u), W(2) =
(
0
−1
)
, B(2) =
(
1
1
)
Let us denote by g : Rn → R2 the resulting function. Observe that g(v) =
(1,max(0, 1 −max(0, g(v) − u)))⊺ for all v ∈ Rn. Hence, we have that cu(v) is
undefined if and only if g(v) ≤ u and yields 1 otherwise.
Lemma 1. Let g : Rn → R be an NN-encoded function and consider the con-
straint ℓ ≤ g(x) ≤ u. One can construct NN-encoded classifiers cℓ and cu, of
size linear with respect to g, for the labelled data set ({0}, {0 7→ 1}) such that
the deterministic attack δ : 0 7→ v
– induces a misclassification of 0 with respect to cℓ if and only if ℓ ≤ g(v) and
– it induces a misclassification of 0 with respect to cu if and only if g(v) ≤ u.
We now show how to modify the NN to obtain classifiers cℓ, cu such that x is
misclassified by both cℓ and cu if and only if the constraint holds.
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Enforcing universal misclassification. A randomized attack with misclassi-
fication value 1 can be assumed to be deterministic. Indeed, from Equation (3)
it follows that for any such randomized attack we must have Mc(δ) = |X | for
all δ ∈ A and all c ∈ C. Hence, we can choose any such δ ∈ A and consider the
randomized attack ({δ}, {δ 7→ 1}) which also has misclassification value 1.
Lemma 2. Consider the labelled data set X = (X, ct) with the finite set of
classifiers C ⊆ C. There exists an ε-bounded randomized attack (A,P) with
Val(A,P) = 1 if and only if there exists a deterministic attack δ such that
– ‖δ(x)‖1 ≤ ε for all x ∈ X and
– for all x ∈ X and all c ∈ C we have that either c(x + δ(x)) is undefined or
it is not equal to ct(x).
With Lemmas 1 and 2 established, the proof of Theorem 1 is now complete.
5 SMT and MILP Encodings
In this section, we describe the main elements of our SMT and MILP encodings
to compute (optimal) randomized attacks or prove the robustness of classifier
ensembles. We start with a base encoding and will afterwards explain how to
explicitly encode the classifiers and the loss function.
5.1 Base problem encoding
First, we assume a labelled data set X = (X, ct), the attack bound ε, and
the robustness bound α are input to the problem. In particular, the data set
X = {x1, . . . ,x|X|} ⊆ Rd has data points xj = (xj1, . . . , x
j
d) ∈ R
d for 1 ≤ j ≤ |X |.
Furthermore, we assume the number |A| of attacks that shall be computed is
fixed. Recall that, to show that the set of classifiers is robust, we can compute a
sufficient bound on the number of attacks — see Sec. 4.1.
For readability, we assume the classifiers C and the loss function ℓ0−1 are
given as functions that can directly be used in the encodings, and we will use
the absolute value |x| for x ∈ R. Afterwards, we discuss how to actually encode
classifiers and the loss function. We use the following variables:
– For the attacks from A, we introduce δ1, . . . , δ|A| with δi ∈ R
|X|×d for 1 ≤
i ≤ |A|. Specifically, δi shall be assigned all attack values for the i-th attack
from A. That is, δji is the attack for the data point x
j = (xj1, . . . , x
j
d) ∈ R
d
with δji = (δ
j,1
i , . . . , δ
j,d
i ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ |X |.
– We introduce p1, . . . , p|A| to form a probability distribution over determin-
istic attacks; pi is assigned the probability to execute attack δi.
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The classifier ensemble C is not ε, α-robust as in Definition 6 if and only if the
following constraints are satisfiable.
∀c ∈ C.
|X|∑
j=1
|A|∑
i=1
(
pi · ℓ0−1(c,x
j , δ
j
i )
)
≥ α · |X | (4)
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}, j ∈ {1, . . . , |X |}.
d∑
k=1
|δj,ki | ≤ ε (5)
|A|∑
i=1
pi = 1 (6)
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}. pi ≥ 0 (7)
Indeed, (4) enforces the misclassification value to be at least α; (5) ensures an
ε-bounded randomized attack; finally, by (6) and (7) the probability variables
induce a valid probability distribution.
Specific encodings. For the SMT encoding, we can make use of the max(·) native
to implement the absolute value. In particular for the MILP, however, we employ
so-called “big-M” tricks to encode max functions and a (restricted) product op-
eration (cf. [7]). Specifically, the product is required to obtain the value resulting
from the multiplication of the loss function and probability variables.
As an example of “big-M” trick, suppose we have variables a ∈ Q∩ [0, 1], b ∈
{0, 1}, and a constant M ∈ Q such that M > a + b. We introduce a variable
c ∈ Q∩ [0, 1] and add the following constraints which clearly enforce that c = ab.
c ≥ a−M(1− b), c ≤ a+M(1− b), c ≤ 0 +Mb .
Note that M can be chosen to be the constant 2 in this case.
Encoding the loss function. We encode the zero-one loss function from Def. 4
as an if-then-else expression making use of the ground truth classifier ct. We
introduce one variable ℓci,j per classifier c ∈ C for all attacks δi ∈ A and all
datapoints xj ∈ X . In the SMT encoding, we can then define
ℓci,j = ITE ((c(x
j + δji ) = ct(x
j)), 0, 1) (8)
so that ℓci,j = ℓ0−1(c,x
j , δ
j
i ). In our MILP encoding we have to simulate the ITE
primitive using constraints similar to the ones mentioned above.
5.2 Classifier encoding
As mentioned in the preliminaries, neural networks implement functions by way
of layer composition. Intuitively, the input of a layer is by a previous layer.
When fed forward, input values are multiplied by a weight, and a bias value
will be added to it. Matrix operations realized by a neural network can thus be
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encoded as linear functions. For max-pooling operations and the ReLU activation
function, one can use the native max(·) operation or implement a maximum using
a “big-M trick”. For this, a suitable constant M has to be obtained beforehand
(cf. [7]). We also use a (discrete) convolution operation, as a linear function.
6 Experiments
In the previous section, we showed that our problem of neural network robustness
verification is NP-hard. Meaningful comparison between approaches, therefore,
needs to be experimental. To that end, we use classifiers trained on multiple
image data sets and report on the comparison between the SMT and MILP
encodings. In what follows, we analyze the running time behavior of the different
verifiers, the generated attacks and the misclassification value for the given data
points, and whether a set of classifiers is robust against predefined thresholds.
6.1 Experimental setup
For each experiment, we define a set of classifiers C, our data points X , the
number of attacks |A|, and both the ε- and α-values. Then, we generate the
attacks A and the probability distribution P using SMT and MILP solvers. If
no randomized attack (A,P) is found (UNSAT), we have shown that our set of
classifiers is ε, α-robust with respect to the predefined thresholds.
Toolchain. Our NN robustness verifier5, is implemented as part of a Python 3.x
toolchain. We use the SMT solver Z3 [9] and the MILP solver Gurobi [14] with
their standard settings. To support arbitrary classifiers, we created a generic
pipeline using the TensorFlow API, and support Max-Pooling layers, convolu-
tional layers, and dense layers with ReLU activation functions [1]. We focus
on binary classifiers by defining certain classification boundaries. We train the
classifiers using the Adam optimizer [17] as well as stochastic gradient descent.
Data sets. MNIST consists of 70 000 images of handwritten digits) [10] and is
widely used for benchmarking in the field of machine learning [16,8]. We trained
classifiers to have a test accuracy of at least 90%.
German traffic sign is a multi-class and single-image classification data set,
containing more than 50 000 images and more than 40 classes [24]. Traffic sign
recognition and potential attacks are of utmost importance for self-driving cars [26].
We extracted the images for “Give way” and “priority” traffic signs from the data
set and trained classifiers on this subset to have an accuracy of at least 80%.
Optimal attacks. As MILP inherently solves optimization problems, we augment
the base encoding from Equations (4)–(7) with the following objective function:
max
|C|∑
k=1
|X |∑
j=1
|A|∑
i=1
(
pi · ℓ0−1(ck,x
j , δ
j
i )
)
.
5 Available at https://tinyurl.com/ensemble-robustness.
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Benchmark Information SMT MILP
ID Name |C| |A| |X | dim α ε Time Val(A, P) Time Val(A, P)
3 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 0.3 1000 80 0.37 0.47 0.3002
9 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 0.4 1000 -TO- – 0.49 0.4002
10 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 0.9 1000 -TO- – 62.54 0.9002
21 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 0.9 3.75 -TO- – TO –
22 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 1 1000 -TO- – 21 robust
12 mnist 0 1 3 4 4 8x8 0.9 60 -TO- – 52.94 1.00
4 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.1 1000 243 0.12 81.7 0.25
6 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.4 100 -TO- – 53.79 0.50
8 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 3 4 8x8 0.9 100 -TO- – 86.34 1.00
23 mnist 0 1 3convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.1 1000 -TO- – TO –
13 mnist 3 6 4 2 2 8x8 0.1 150 47 0.25 22.3 0.1005
14 mnist 3 6 4 2 3 8x8 0.1 150 85 0.33 24.7 0.1003
19 mnist 7 8 3 4 4 6x6 0.1 60 -TO- – 18.36 0.25
20 mnist 7 8 3 10 4 6x6 0.1 60 -TO- – 66.5 0.25
27 mnist 7 8 3 5 4 6x6 0.9 0.1 -TO- – 9.37 robust
31 mnist 0 2 3 30 4 9x9 1 0.01 -TO- – 146.98 robust
32 traffic signs 3 1 4 10x10 0.1 1000 -TO- – 71 0.25
33 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 0.2 1000 -TO- – 1437.1 0.25
35 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 0.1 -TO- – 23.23 robust
38 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 2 -TO- – 27.28 robust
Table 1. SMT versus MILP (TO stands for timeout)
An optimal solution with respect to the objectivemay yield a randomized attack
inducing the maximal misclassification value among all ε-bounded attacks.6
Alternative attacks. Our method generates attacks taking the whole ensemble
of classifiers into account, which is computationally harder than just consid-
ering single classifiers [15,12] due to an increased number of constraints and
variables in the underlying encodings. To showcase the need for our approach,
we implemented two other ways to generate attacks that are based on individual
classifiers and subsequently lifted to the whole ensemble. Recall that we assume
the attacker does not know which classifier from the ensemble will be chosen.
First, for the classifier ensemble C we compute — using a simplified version
of our MILP encoding — an optimal attack δc for each classifier c ∈ C. Each
such δc maximizes the misclassification value, that is, the loss, for the classifier
c. The attack set AC = {δc | c ∈ C} together with a uniform distribution DistrA
over AC form the so-called uniform attacker (AC ,DistrA).
Second, to compare with deterministic attacks, we calculate for each attack
from AC the misclassification value over all classifiers. The best deterministic
attack is any attack from AC inducing a maximal misclassification value.
6.2 Evaluation
We report on our experimental results using the aforementioned data sets and
attacks. For all experiments we used a timeout of 7200 seconds (TO). Each
benchmark has an ID, a name, the number |C| of classifiers, the number |A| of
6 Note that we sum over classifiers instead of minimizing, as required in Val(A,P
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Benchmark Information MILP MaxMILP
ID Name |C| |A| |X | dim α ε Time Val(A, P) Time Val(A, P)
2 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 7x7 0.2 100 17 0.2002 17.97 1.00*
3 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 0.3 1000 0.47 0.3002 0.47 1.00*
4 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.1 1000 81.7 0.25 81.69 1.00*
23 mnist 0 1 3convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.1 1000 -TO- – -TO- –
31 mnist 0 2 3 30 4 9x9 1 0.01 146.98 robust 2.49 robust
13 mnist 3 6 4 2 2 8x8 0.1 150 22.30 0.1005 22.3 1.00*
14 mnist 3 6 4 2 3 8x8 0.1 150 24.7 0.1003 24.7 1.00*
19 mnist 7 8 3 4 4 6x6 0.1 60 18.36 0.25 18.36 1.00
20 mnist 7 8 3 10 4 6x6 0.1 60 66.5 0.25 66.54 1.00
25 mnist 7 8 3 2 4 6x6 1 0.1 2.56 robust 1 robust
27 mnist 7 8 3 5 4 6x6 0.9 0.1 9.37 robust 981 robust
32 traffic signs 3 1 4 10x10 0.1 1000 71 0.25 71.08 1.00*
33 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 0.2 1000 1437.1 0.25 1177.39 1.00*
34 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 0.01 13.89 robust 3.91 robust
38 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 2 27.28 robust 15 robust
Table 2. MILP versus MaxMILP
attacks, the size |X | of the data set, the dimension of the image (dim), the robust-
ness bound α, and the attack bound ε. The names of the MNIST benchmarks
are of the form “mnist x y”, where x and y are the labels; the additional suffix
“ nconvs” indicates that the classifier has n convolutional layers. We provide an
excerpt of our experiments, full tables are available in the appendix.
SMT versus MILP. In Table 1, we report on the comparison between SMT
and MILP. Note that for these benchmarks, the MILP solver just checks the
feasibility of the constraints without an objective function. We list for both
solvers the time in seconds and the misclassification value Val(A,P), rounded
to 2 decimal places, for the generated randomized attack (A,P), if it can be
computed before the timeout. If there is no solution, the classifier ensemble C is
ε, α-robust, and instead of a misclassification value we list “robust”.
We observe that SMT is only able to find solutions within the timeout for
small α and large ε values. Moreover, if the ensemble is robust, that is, the
problem is not satisfiable, the solver does not terminate for any benchmark. The
MILP solver, on the other hand, is able to solve most of our benchmarks mostly
within less than a minute, including the robust ones. Despite the reasonably low
timeout of 7200 seconds, we can verify the robustness of NNs with around 6
layers. Running time visibly differ for other factors such as layer types.
MILP versus MaxMILP. Table 2 compares some of the MILP results to those
where we optimize the mentioned objective function, denoted by MaxMILP. The
MILP solver Gurobi offers the possibility of so-called callbacks, that is, while an
intermediate solution is not proven to be optimal, it may already be feasible. In
case optimality cannot be shown within the timeout, we list the current (feasible)
solution, and mark optimal solutions with ∗. The misclassification value for the
MaxMILP solver is always 1. For robust ensembles, it is interesting to see that
the MaxMILP encoding sometimes needs less time.
Robustness Verification for Classifier Ensembles 15
Benchmark Information UA BDA MaxMILP
ID Name |C| |A| |X| dim Epsilon Alpha Val(A, P) Val(A, P) Val(A, P)
2 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 7x7 100 0.2 0.33 0.75 1.00*
4 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 1000 0.1 0.33 0.75 1.00*
13 mnist 3 6 4 2 2 8x8 150 0.1 0.25 0.50 1.00*
14 mnist 3 6 4 2 3 8x8 150 0.1 0.25 0.67 1.00*
19 mnist 7 8 3 4 4 6x6 60 0.1 0.33 0.75 1.00
20 mnist 7 8 3 10 4 6x6 60 0.1 0.33 0.75 1.00
32 traffic signs 3 1 4 10x10 1000 0.1 0.33 0.50 1.00*
33 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1000 0.2 0.33 0.50 1.00*
Table 3. Attacker Comparison
MaxMILP versus alternative attacks. In Table 3, we compare the MaxMILP
method to the uniform attacker (UA) and the best deterministic attacker (BDA).
What we can see is that the best deterministic attacker usually achieves higher
misclassification values than the uniform attacker, but none of them are able to
reach the actual optimum of 1.
Discussion of the results. Within the timeout, our method is able to generate
optimal results for medium-sized neural networks. The running time is mainly
influenced by the number and type of the used layers, in particular, it is governed
by convolutional and max-pooling layers: these involve more matrix operations
than dense layers. As expected, larger values of the robustness bound α and
smaller values of the attack bound ε typically increase the running times.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We presented a new method to formally verify the robustness or, vice versa,
compute optimal attacks for an ensemble of classifiers. Despite the theoretical
hardness, we were able to, in particular by using MILP-solving, provide results
for meaningful benchmarks. In future work, we will render our method more
scalable towards a standalone verification tool for neural network ensembles.
Moreover, we will explore settings where we do not have white-box access to the
classifiers and employ state-of-the-art classifier stealing methods.
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A Full Experimental Results
Benchmark Information SMT MILP
ID Name |C| |A| |X | dim α ε Time Val(A, P) Time Val(A, P)
1 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 7x7 0.1 1000 -TO- – 285 0.25
2 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 7x7 0.2 100 -TO- – 17 0.2002
3 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 0.3 1000 80 0.37 0.47 0.3002
4 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.1 1000 243 0.12 81.7 0.25
5 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.2 1000 -TO- – 92.45 0.25
6 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.4 100 -TO- – 53.79 0.5
7 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.9 100 -TO- – 55.19 0.9002
8 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 3 4 8x8 0.9 100 -TO- – 86.34 1.00
9 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 0.4 1000 -TO- – 0.49 0.4002
10 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 0.9 1000 -TO- – 62.54 0.9002
11 mnist 0 1 3 3 4 8x8 0.9 60 -TO- – 33.19 1.00
12 mnist 0 1 3 4 4 8x8 0.9 60 -TO- – 52.94 1.00
13 mnist 3 6 4 2 2 8x8 0.1 150 47 0.25 22.3 0.1005
14 mnist 3 6 4 2 3 8x8 0.1 150 85 0.33 24.7 0.1003
15 mnist 4 5 3 2 4 10x10 0.1 1000 188 0.63 99.77 0.25
16 mnist 4 5 3 2 4 10x10 0.2 100 -TO- – 34.6 0.25
17 mnist 4 5 3 4 4 10x10 0.3 50 -TO- – 128.78 0.3002
18 mnist 4 5 3 4 4 10x10 0.9 50 -TO- – 174.8 0.93
19 mnist 7 8 3 4 4 6x6 0.1 60 -TO- – 18.36 0.25
20 mnist 7 8 3 10 4 6x6 0.1 60 -TO- – 66.5 0.25
21 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 0.9 3.75 -TO- – -TO- –
22 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 1 1000 -TO- – 21 robust
23 mnist 0 1 3convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.1 1000 -TO- – -TO- –
24 mnist 3 6 2 9 2 8x8 1 0.005 -TO- – 13.31 robust
25 mnist 7 8 3 2 4 6x6 1 0.1 -TO- – 2.56 robust
26 mnist 7 8 3 2 4 6x6 0.9 0.1 -TO- – 4.5 robust
27 mnist 7 8 3 5 4 6x6 0.9 0.1 -TO- – 9.37 robust
28 mnist 7 8 3 5 4 6x6 0.9 0.2 -TO- – 18.48 robust
29 mnist 7 8 3 7 4 6x6 0.9 0.3 -TO- – 187.4 robust
30 mnist 0 2 3 27 4 9x9 1 0.01 -TO- – 114.99 robust
31 mnist 0 2 3 30 4 9x9 1 0.01 -TO- – 146.98 robust
32 traffic signs 3 1 4 10x10 0.1 1000 -TO- – 71 0.25
33 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 0.2 1000 -TO- – 1437.1 0.25
34 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 0.01 -TO- – 13.89 robust
35 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 0.1 -TO- – 23.23 robust
36 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 0.2 -TO- – 20.62 robust
37 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 1 -TO- – 24.47 robust
38 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 2 -TO- – 27.28 robust
Table 4. SMT versus MILP
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Benchmark Information MILP MaxMILP
ID Name |C| |A| |X | dim α ε Time Val(A, P) Time Val(A, P)
2 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 7x7 0.2 100 17 0.2002 17.97 1.00*
3 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 0.3 1000 0.47 0.3002 0.47 1.00*
4 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.1 1000 81.7 0.25 81.69 1.00*
5 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.2 1000 92.45 0.25 92.45 1.00*
6 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.4 100 53.79 0.5 53.78 1.00*
7 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.9 100 55.19 0.9002 55.18 1.00*
8 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 3 4 8x8 0.9 100 86.34 1.00 86.33 1.00*
9 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 0.4 1000 0.49 0.4002 0.48 1.00*
10 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 0.9 1000 62.54 0.9002 62.53 1.00*
11 mnist 0 1 3 3 4 8x8 0.9 60 33.19 1.00 33.18 1.00*
12 mnist 0 1 3 4 4 8x8 0.9 60 52.94 1.00 52.93 1.00*
13 mnist 3 6 4 2 2 8x8 0.1 150 22.30 0.1005 22.3 1.00*
14 mnist 3 6 4 2 3 8x8 0.1 150 24.7 0.1003 24.7 1.00*
15 mnist 4 5 3 2 4 10x10 0.1 1000 99.77 0.25 99.7 1.00*
16 mnist 4 5 3 2 4 10x10 0.2 100 34.6 0.25 34.61 1.00*
17 mnist 4 5 3 4 4 10x10 0.3 50 128.78 0.3002 128.77 1.00
18 mnist 4 5 3 4 4 10x10 0.9 50 174.8 0.93 174.8 1.00
19 mnist 7 8 3 4 4 6x6 0.1 60 18.36 0.25 18.36 1.00
20 mnist 7 8 3 10 4 6x6 0.1 60 66.5 0.25 66.54 1.00
21 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 0.9 3.75 -TO- – -TO- –
22 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 1 1000 21 robust 1.47 robust
23 mnist 0 1 3convs 3 2 4 8x8 0.1 1000 -TO- – -TO- –
24 mnist 3 6 2 9 2 8x8 1 0.005 13.31 robust 2.4 robust
25 mnist 7 8 3 2 4 6x6 1 0.1 2.56 robust 1 robust
26 mnist 7 8 3 2 4 6x6 0.9 0.1 4.5 robust 7.6 robust
27 mnist 7 8 3 5 4 6x6 0.9 0.1 9.37 robust 981 robust
30 mnist 0 2 3 27 4 9x9 1 0.01 114.99 robust 2.19 robust
31 mnist 0 2 3 30 4 9x9 1 0.01 146.98 robust 2.49 robust
32 traffic signs 3 1 4 10x10 0.1 1000 71 0.25 71.08 1.00*
33 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 0.2 1000 1437.1 0.25 1177.39 1.00*
34 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 0.01 13.89 robust 3.91 robust
35 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 0.1 23.23 robust 5.5 robust
36 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 0.2 20.62 robust 8 robust
37 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 1 24.47 robust 18.7 robust
38 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1 2 27.28 robust 15 robust
Table 5. MILP versus MaxMILP
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Benchmark Information UA BDA MaxMILP
ID Name |C| |A| |X| dim Epsilon Alpha Val(A, P) Val(A, P) Val(A, P)
1 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 7x7 1000 0.1 0.33 0.75 1.00*
2 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 7x7 100 0.2 0.33 0.75 1.00*
3 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 1000 0.3 0.33 0.75 1.00*
4 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 1000 0.1 0.33 0.75 1.00*
5 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 1000 0.2 0.33 0.75 1.00*
6 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 100 0.4 0.33 0.25 1.00*
7 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 2 4 8x8 100 0.9 0.33 0.25 1.00*
8 mnist 0 1 2convs 3 3 4 8x8 100 0.9 0.33 0.25 1.00*
9 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 1000 0.4 0.33 0.75 1.00*
10 mnist 0 1 3 2 4 8x8 1000 0.9 0.33 0.50 1.00*
11 mnist 0 1 3 3 4 8x8 60 0.9 0.33 0.50 1.00*
12 mnist 0 1 3 4 4 8x8 60 0.9 0.33 0.50 1.00*
13 mnist 3 6 4 2 2 8x8 150 0.1 0.25 0.50 1.00*
14 mnist 3 6 4 2 3 8x8 150 0.1 0.25 0.66 1.00*
15 mnist 4 5 3 2 4 10x10 1000 0.1 0.33 0.75 1.00*
16 mnist 4 5 3 2 4 10x10 100 0.2 0.33 0.75 1.00*
17 mnist 4 5 3 4 4 10x10 50 0.3 0.33 0.25 1.00
18 mnist 4 5 3 4 4 10x10 50 0.9 0.33 0.50 1.00
19 mnist 7 8 3 4 4 6x6 60 0.1 0.33 0.75 1.00
20 mnist 7 8 3 10 4 6x6 60 0.1 0.33 0.75 1.00
32 traffic signs 3 1 4 10x10 1000 0.1 0.33 0.50 1.00*
33 traffic signs 3 2 4 10x10 1000 0.2 0.33 0.50 1.00*
Table 6. Attacker Comparison
